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After an increasing development in the field of electronic communication, The European 
Union now imposes all Contracting States to retain communication data from every user of 
electronic communication services. This is done through directive 2006/24/EC, the so-called 
„data retention directive‟. The purpose with this directive is the investigation, detection and 
prosecution of serious crime. Also member states within the European Economic Community 
(EEC) will have to follow this directive as the European Court of Justice found it to be „inner 
marked relevant‟. Communication data is the opposite of communication content; it is data 
about the „traffic‟ of electronic communication, but not its actual content. 
This piece of work seeks to highlight if this mass retention of this type of data from entire 
populations with the purpose of future crime investigations is compatible with fundamental 
human rights enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights, and especially the 
right of privacy which is enshrined in the Conventions article 8. The findings of this piece of 
work reveal a dangerous surveillance measure that can have negative impacts on not only 
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Chapter 1: Introduction. 
In the last two decades the world has gone through major changes. One trend in particular is 
that the world depends more and more on information and communication technology. The 
world has „gone digital‟, and for most people new technology plays a crucial part in their 
daily lives from the use of a computer and having internet access at home or work, to texting 
or making calls on a mobile phone. Even if people do not make direct use of these 
technologies, they are surrounded by networks through which information constantly flows1. 
Information technologies are of value to investigators too, and in the wake of sophisticated 
terror-atrocities throughout the world, the needs for more effective tools for law enforcement 
were stressed by governments throughout the western world. Directive 2006/24/EC; the data 
retention directive, was adopted by the European Union (EU) on the 15 March 2006, 
requiring the retention of telecommunications data for a period of six months up to two years2. 
The data retention directive represents in many ways one of the most intrusive surveillance 
measures ever; societies dependence on digital technology now makes it possible to monitor 
every aspect of peoples lives, The opportunities for surveillance that technology gives might 
be a useful tool to fight criminality and terror, but on the other hand there are not just 
terrorists and criminals who get affected by it, but all of us. It is therefore important to discuss 
how far it is reasonable to stretch the possibilities that technology gives us in the struggle for a 
safer society3.  
Whatever a person does when using a mobile phone or the internet can be effortlessly 
centrally recorded4. Communication data, as opposed to the actual content of communication 
allows whoever has access to it to establish who has communicated with whom and at what 
time, in the case of mobile phones, the geographical movements of the owner can be tracked 
as well5. The analysis of traffic data may reveal details of a person‟s political, financial, 
                                                          
1
 The Office for National Statistics (ONS) Social Trends 41: e-Society. (2010) available at 
<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/search/index.html?pageSize=50&sortBy=none&sortDirection=none&newquery=so
cial+trends+41> (accessed 9/8 2012) 
2
 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the council, Art 6. 
3
 Jocahim Hammerlin: „Terror & demokrati. Fra 11.september til 22‟ Juli. Forlaget manifest AS, Oslo (2011). 
23. 
4
 Patrick Breyer‟ Telecommunications Data Retention and Human Rights: The Compatibility of Blanket Traffic 
Data Retention with the ECHR.  European law review, vol. 11 no.3, May 2005. 365 
5
 ibid 




religious stance, or other interests6.  The question is if such retention of every citizen‟s 
communication data is consistent with the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
requirements for privacy and the right of private correspondence which after the Conventions 
art 8, which is also related to and overlap the freedom to hold opinions and receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority after ECHR art 10.  
A number of civil society organisations wrote to the commission arguing that data retention 
is, in principle, an unnecessary restriction of individuals' right to privacy7. They consider the 
non-consensual „blanket and indiscriminate‟ retention of individuals‟ telecommunication 
traffic, location and subscriber data to be an unlawful restriction of fundamental rights8. Also, 
the European Data Protection Supervisor expressed doubts about the necessity of the 
measure9. Furthermore, this seemingly straightforward directive has „generated‟ quite an 
impressive number of court judgments10. They range from the European Court of justice11 
(ECJ) to the Constitutional Courts of some Member States12. While the ECJ ruling is 
concerned with the legal basis of the directive itself, the constitutional judgments in different 
member states subject the national implementation of the Directive in order to test concerns 
about the legality, the legitimate purpose and proportionality of the measures13. The 
Constitutional courts in Germany, Romania and Bulgaria have all found the implementation 
of the directive to be breaching their constitutions, with some different reasoning: The focus 
of the German constitutional court have been on access and use of retained data, it does not 
condemn data retention itself14. The Bulgarian constitutional aversion to centralized storage 
                                                          
6
 Ibid  
7
 Report from the Commission to the council and the European Parliament – Evaluation report on the Data 




 European Data Protection Supervisor Press release: „Data Retention Directive fails to meet data protection 
requirements‟ ( 1 June, 2011) Available at: <http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number9.11/data-retention-directive-
failure-edps> 
10
 de Vries, Bellanova & de Hert, „Proportionality overrides Unlimited Surveillance: The German Constitutional 
Court Judgment on Data Retention‟ (May 2010) CEPS „Liberty and Security in Europe‟ p 1 
11
 Ireland v European Parliament, Council of the European Union (Case C-301/06) Action for annulment - 
Directive 2006/24/EC - Retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of electronic 
communications services – Choice of legal basis. Judgment of the European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) 
of 10 February 2009  
12
  Germany, Romania and Bulgaria. 
13
 de Vries, Bellanova & de Hert (n.10) p 7. 
14
 Judgment of the German constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), Vorratsdatenspeicherung  [Data 
retention] BverfG, 2 March 2010, 1 BvR 256/08. Available at: 




and direct access with any court control is very similar to the reasoning found in the German 
judgment15. The Romanian court‟s approach  on the other hand has been considering blanket 
retention of data disproportionate by nature as well as the legislation on access and use of 
retained data16.  
This illustrates that the directive rises a distinction; on one hand there is the directive itself, 
and on another hand there is the national implementation of the directive. This piece of work 
will deal with both the directive as a whole, and the national implementation when it comes to 
use and access of retained communication data, in the United Kingdom, and in Norway. 
This piece of work will in chapter 2 give an introduction to Directive 2006/24/EC and also 
give an introduction to the human rights mechanisms within the EU, and Europe as a whole. 
Chapter 3 will give detailed human rights critique of the directive itself; it will analyse if 
Directive 2006/24/EC as a whole is an interference with the right to privacy as enshrined in 
ECHR art 8; if it is in accordance with the law, if it is necessary in a democratic society; 
which is a matter of proportionality. Chapter 4 will assess a human rights critique of  the 
United Kingdom‟s implementation of the directive through Regulations 2009/857, where 
access and use of communication data is regulated through the Regulatory of Investigatory act 
2000 (RIPA). Chapter 5 will focus on the Norwegian implementation of the directive, which 
is still not in force, and highlight the differences between the United Kingdom and the 
Norwegian approach of the implementation. This thesis will reveal a directive that is in itself 
disproportionate; and national implementations of this directive that in the United Kingdom 
breaches fundamental human rights, but doesn‟t affect Norway to the same extent.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
<http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20100302_1bvr025608.html> (accessed at 
29/05/2012) 
cited in de Vries, Bellanova & de Hert (n.10) p 8 
15
 Decision no. 13627, Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court („Върховния административен съд‟), 
December 2008. Commentary in English: <http://www.edri.org/edri-gram/number6.24/bulgarian-administrative-
case-data-retention>  (Accessed at 29/05/2012). 
cited in de Vries, Bellanova & de Hert (n.10) p 8 
16
 Decision no.1258, Romanian Constitutional Court, 8 October 2009. Published in the Romanian Official 
Monitor, no. 789, 23 November 2009. English translation (unofficial): <http://www.legi-
internet.ro/fileadmin/editor_folder/pdf/decision-constitutional-court-romania-data-retention.pdf> (accessed at 
29/05 2012) 
cited in de Vries, Bellanova & de Hert (n.10) p 8 




Chapter 2: Retention of communication data: an initial human rights critique. 
2.1 The directive‟s background and content 
The Madrid and London bombings, which together resulted in more than 250 deaths, revealed 
that Europe‟s counter terrorism strategy was far from adequate17. In 2004 the EU adopted a 
declaration18  where the need to adopt common measures to retain data in combating terrorism 
was stressed. The European Council was asked by the commission to come up with ideas for 
the establishment of common EU rules for the retaining of electronic communication, which 
led to a proposal for a council decision about data-retention. This proposal was submitted by 
Sweden, the UK, France and Ireland in April 200419. The proposal was rejected by the 
European Parliament in September 2005 on the basis that this was founded upon Articles 31 
and 34 in the Treaty of the EU, which is the so-called „third pillar‟ of the Union; Police and 
Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters. In 2005 the commission made a proposal for a 
directive, where they argued that the legal basis for data retention belongs in the scheme of 
the free market, rather than „the pillar‟ of Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal 
Matters. The proposal from the Commission was changed in certain areas after negotiations 
with the EU Parliament and the Council 20 and after some further changes it was accepted. In 
March 2006 the Data retention directive was adopted by the EU. 
Today the data retention directive imposes the Member States of the EU and the European 
Economic Community21 (EEC) to retain data that can identify and trace the participants in a 
phone call and the type of phone which is used, the time for the communication, and the 
geographical location of the person participating in the communication, and which time the 
telecommunication took place22. Furthermore, the data retention directive also demands traffic 
data from internet usage to be stored. Data which is necessary to identify the user behind an 
                                                          
17
 Marie-Helen Maras: „From targeted to mass surveillance: is the EU data retention directive a necessary 
measure or an unjustified threat to privacy‟ in „New Directions in Surveillance and Privacy‟. Willan Publishing 
(2009)  76.  
18
 European Council Declaration of Combating Terrorism (adopted on 25 march 2004)  
19
 Prop. 49 L (2010-2011) Endringer i ekomloven og straffeprosessloven mv. (gjennomfoering av EU‟s 
datalagringsdirektiv i norsk rett. 11 Para 2.1 




 Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland 
22
 Directive 2006/24/EC, Art 3.1 – Art 5.1 




IP-address, in regard to both the use of and communication over the internet is retained23. The 
data is stored for a minimum period of six months and a maximum of two years24. The DRD 
does not obligate the states to retain the content of the correspondence such as for example 
which websites have been visited or the actual content of a text message or the content in an 
e-mail25. In other words, it is the so-called „traffic data‟ or „communication data‟ that is 
retained, and not the „content data‟ or „communication content‟. 
The purpose of the data retention is the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious 
crimes.26 What is considered „serious crime‟ is not defined by the directive, so it is up to each 
Member State to consider what is included within this definition of serious crimes in 
accordance with its national laws subject to the relevant provisions of EU law or public 
international law27. Also, what procedures are followed and the conditions required in order to 
gain access to the retained data is up to the Member States to decide28. 
2.2 Introduction to European Human Rights Law. 
The three formal sources for European Union (EU) Human rights law are listed in Article 6 of 
the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). The first one is the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights which was proclaimed in 2000, and upgraded to the same binding legal status as the 
Treaties by Lisbon in 2009. The second is the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR), which has long been treated by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as a „special 
source of inspiration‟. The third is the „general principles of EU law‟, a body of legal 
principles, including human rights, which have been articulated and developed by the ECJ for 
years, drawing from national constitutional traditions, the ECHR and other international 
treaties signed by the Member States. These three sources overlap, since many provisions of 
the EU charter are based on the ECHR, creating a certain amount of legal confusion29.  




 Ibid, Art 6 
25
 Ibid, Art 1.2 
26
 Ibid, Art 1.1 
27




  Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca. „EU Law – text, cases and materials‟. (2011) Oxford university press. 362-
367 




By treating the ECHR as a source of inspiration rather than a formally binding or fully 
binding agreement, the EU and the ECJ retained the freedom to „go beyond‟ the Convention 
in recognizing or not recognize rights as part of EU law30. This means that, in theory, the ECJ 
can decide to deem directives that are in total breach of the rights such as those enshrined in 
the ECHR to still be compatible with EU law. In other words: the question about the legality 
of the directive itself is an ECJ question. The question if the implementation of the directive 
on a national level is compatible with human right standards is on the other hand a ECHR 
question relevant for the European Court of Human Right (ECtHR). However, it seems clear 
that the ECJ is willing to look closely at the relevant ECtHR case law for guidance31.  
It is implied in the directive that the EU presumes that this form of data retention is consistent 
with both the Union‟s Charter of Fundamental Right, and with the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). The European Union assumes that as long as the processing of 
retained data and the conditions for disclosure of this data to the police or prosecuting 
authorities is in accordance with the basic requirements of the rule of law and proportionality 
that the ECHR demands - the human right aspect will be safeguarded32.  
The next chapter will assess if the question of the storage and retention of data which is 
regulated by Directive 2006/24/EC fulfills the human rights standards set out in the 













 Jon Wessel-Aas. „Datalagringsdirektivet – er dets krav om lagring av trafikkdata forenelig med den europeiske 
menneskerettighetskonvensjonen?‟ (2010) Nordisk årbok i rettsinformatikk, 136. (Journal article on the data 
retention directives compability with the ECHR) 
  




Chapter 3: Retention of communications data – a human rights critique. 
In regard to the Human right aspects of the data retention directive, Human Right issues 
concerning the Contracting States implementation of the directive have not yet been up for the 
ECtHR. Cases that have been up for the ECtHR that concern privacy, have mostly been 
concerned around if the specific (targeted) measures have been proportionate, and if control 
mechanisms of the specific measures that have been used have been sufficient in line with the 
principles of the convention and the rule of law. What we see within the scheme of both the 
practice of the ECtHR and the constitutional courts judgments, such as the German 
Constitutional Courts judgment of the 2nd of march 201033 where it said „no‟ to the German 
implementation laws of the directive, seem to indicate the emergence of a new important 
demarcation within data retention34. On one hand there is the question of the storage and 
retention of data, which is regulated by the data retention directive, and on the other hand 
there is the question of the use and access to these data, which falls under the competency of 
the individual member state35.  
However, some cases that in many ways raise the same issues as the directive have been up 
for the court and one case has concerned the principle of in-discriminatory mass retention of 
highly personal data of innocent and acquitted individuals36. Before looking at the specific 
cases, there will be necessary to evaluate if the directive constitutes an interference with 
ECHR art. 8:  
“Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.” 
                                                          
33
 Supra (n 10) 
34




 Case of S and Marper v the United Kingdom (2008) ECHR 1581 





If the directive is interfering with the right for private and family life, home and 
correspondence as stated in the first section, for the directive then to be accepted in spite of its 
infringing nature, it has to pass a legality, necessity and proportionality test after section two. 
It must be in „accordance with the law‟ which means it has to have its basis in some domestic 
law. Furthermore, it has to be adequately accessible and must be formulated so that it is 
sufficiently foreseeable37. The second condition that has to be met is that it has to be 
„necessary in a democratic society‟ in pursuit of one or more legitimate aims as prescribed in 
Art 8.2. Thirdly, it has to pass a proportionality test38.  Proportionality requires that there is a 
rational connection between the objective a particular measure pursues, and the means the 
state has employed to achieve that objective39. 
3.1 Is the data retention directive an interference of ECHR Art.8.? 
The question, whether this retaining of traffic data from phones and phone calls is considered 
to be an infringement according to ECHR Art 8, can be answered positively with the case of 
Malone v the United Kingdom40. The judgment concerned the laws and practices in England 
and Wales allowing interception of communications and “metering" of telephones by or on 
behalf of the police41. The Strasbourg court held that metering information, which includes 
information on numbers dialed is an „integral element‟ in the communications made by 
telephone and the duration of the calls made, falls within the scope of „private life‟ under 
ECHR Article 8(1).42  
The case of Copland v the United Kingdom43 shows that storage of traffic data when it comes 
to the use of internet and email also can be considered a breach of Art 8.1. In this case the 
                                                          
37
 Maras (n 17) 81 
38
 Maras (n 17) 87 
39
 Emmerson & Ashworth „A Human Rights and Criminal justice‟ (2001) London: Swet and Maxwell p 93. 
Maras (n 17) 87  
40
 Case of Malone v United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 14 
41
 Council of Europe report: „Case law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the protection of 
personal data‟ (DP 2009 Case law) Available at: 
<http://www.coe.int/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=ec21d8f2-46a9-4c6e-8184-
dffd9d3e3e6b&groupId=10227> (accessed 12/08/2012) 14  
42
 Malone v United kingdom (n 40) para. 84 
Maras (n 17) 80 
43
 Case of Copland v the United Kingdom App no. 62617/00 (03/04/2007) 




Court considered that the employers collection and storage of personal information by the use 
of the telephone, e-mail and internet at the workplace interfered with the employees right to 
respect of private life and correspondence, Furthermore, in the case of Leander v Sweden44 it 
was confirmed by the Strasbourg court that the retention of private information is a breach of 
Art 8 when it happens without the consent of the citizens concerned45.  
These cases combined show that the storage and retaining of traffic data both when it comes 
to communications by phone, via e-mail and internet will be an interference of Art 8; the right 
to privacy and correspondence, and therefore the retention of these types of data, which is the 
core of the data retention directive, needs to be justified by the criteria in Art 8.2 to be 
pursuant with the human rights standards enshrined in ECHR.  
3.2 Is the data retention directive „In Accordance with the law‟? 
Having concluded in section 3.21 that the directive constitutes an interference of ECHR Art.8 
for the directive then to be accepted in spite of being an interference of Art 8, it must be in 
„accordance with the law‟. This means it has to have its basis in some domestic law. 
Furthermore, it has to be adequately accessible and must be formulated so that it is 
sufficiently foreseeable46. 
The data retention laws stem from EU directive 2006/24/EC and are implemented in the 
contracting states through national legislation. This means it has legal basis in an EU directive 
which is made a part of domestic law, and hence is available and known for the public. The 
requirements of retention that the directive itself sets out are therefore in accordance with the 
law. However, the directive gives the states a margin of discretion how to implement the 
directive in its national laws, for example on which grounds authorities can acquire and obtain 
access to retained communication data. This national legislation will also have to meet the 
requirements to be foreseeable, accessible and formulated so it is sufficiently forseeable for 
the public. The ECtHR decision in Liberty and others v. the United Kingdom47 points to that 
the law has to be precise, so that the authorities are not granted an unfettered discretion to 
perform general surveillance measures. The legality of the national legislation, such as the 
                                                          
44
 Case of Leander v. Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433 
45
 Wessel-Aas (n 32) 137 
46
 Maras (n 17) 81 
47
 Case of Liberty and Others v. The United Kingdom App no 58243/00 (ECtHR 01/07/2008) 




access and use of retained data will be taken in account as factors determining the 
proportionality of the directive. This will be done further down in chapter 4 and 5, focusing 
on the national implementation of the directive in the United Kingdom, and Norway. To sum 
up; the directive itself is in accordance with the law, but the national implementation of the 
directive, might or might not be in accordance with the law.  
3.3 Is the data retention directive necessary in a „democratic society‟? 
The second condition that has to be met if for the directive to be accepted in spite of being an 
interference with art 8, is that the measures in it has to be „necessary in a democratic society‟ 
in pursuit of one or more legitimate aims as prescribed in Art 8(2). Recital 21 of the Directive 
reveals that this measure pursues a legitimate aim because its objective is to retain data for the 
„purpose of the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime‟ where serious crime 
such as terrorism falls within the categories of the legitimate aims mentioned in Article 8(2)48. 
This gives the states certain discretion in what measures it might use to pursue this national 
interest. 
The ECtHR has clearly stated that the social aim pursued must be balanced against the 
seriousness of the interference and that the social need must be sufficiently pressing to 
outweigh the human right in question49. Some have interpreted the jurisprudence of the Court 
of Human Rights as outlawing any exploratory or general surveillance not carried out on a 
case-by-case basis in the event of reasonable suspicion. It is unclear whether the Court of 
Human Rights would indeed take such a stance50. So far, it has not decided on the matter51.In 
its decision on the Weber and Saravia v Germany52, the Court of Human Rights noted that the 
Act did not permit „so-called exploratory or general surveillance but did not elaborate on the 
consequences this would enable53. Therefore, this mention does not provide a sufficient basis 
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 Maras (n 17) 85 
49




 July 2012 
52
 Case of Weber and Saravia v Germany App no. 54934/00 (ECtHR 29/06/2006) 
53
 Breyer (n 4) 368 




for legal argument; instead, the compatibility of data retention with Article 8 is an issue of 
proportionality54. 
3.4 Proportionality. 
Proportionality requires that there is a rational connection between the objective a particular 
measure pursues and the means the state has employed to achieve that objective55. In other 
words: under the label „necessity in a democratic society‟ a proportionality test has to be 
conducted. The interference must be proportionate to the legitimate aim of the restriction. The 
ECtHR affords to the State a margin of appreciation when deciding whether an interference 
with an Article 8 right is justified under paragraph 2 of that provision, this margin of 
appreciation as a factor determining proportionality will be dealt with for UK in chapter 4 and 
Norway in chapter 5.  
3.41 Retention of communication data.  
The Data retention directive represents a blanket approach to surveillance, where the majority 
of the populations that will be affected by it are bound not to be terrorists or criminals56. The 
nature of the directive differs from most of the cases that have been up for the ECtHR in 
regard to infringements of privacy where most cases have mainly revolved around individuals 
whose personal information have been retained and used for more or less targeted purposes; 
such as specific criminal cases under investigation, or to prevent terrorism or other serious 
crimes which threaten national security. The main elements in the ECtHR assessment have 
been to avoid that the infringements is arbitrary or disproportional towards the individual who 
is affected57 and have not taken in account mass-surveillance.  
The case of S and Marper v the United Kingdom  however shows that the ECtHR can be 
willing to do a concrete evaluation of the proportionality of blanket data retention itself. In 
this case the ECHR found the retention of DNA from innocent or acquitted people to be a 
breach of Art.8.   
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3.42 The judgment of S and Marper v the United Kingdom58. 
In this case the Court were not first and foremost interested in the guarantees and safeguards 
against misuse of retained information, but rather focused on the issues of blanket retention of 
innocent individuals as a principle.  It is the only case for the Strasbourg Court which 
concerns mandatory mass retention of personal information of law abiding citizens, without 
other purposes than for use in future criminal cases59.  
S and Marper v UK concerned mass data retention, like the directive. More precisely it 
concerned the retention and use of information that was retained in DNA-registers.  In this 
case, the complainants were two British citizens who both had their cases dropped. In both 
cases biometrical information and DNA samples had been retained for investigation, and 
when afterwards the complainants was acquitted and demanded that their fingerprints and 
DNA samples be destructed, the Police refused to do so. The background for this was the UK 
practice in the area. The UK started with DNA-registers in 1995 and today has the largest 
database of this kind of information in the world. In 2008 it contained around 5 million 
people, of which half million were children under the age of 1660. With an increase of around 
700 000 per year it is estimated that the database today has at least 6 million profiles, ca 10% 
of the British population61.  
The reason for the massive increase in the information stored in this database can be traced 
back to 2003, when the British government started to register DNA of anyone arrested for any 
criminal felony62. This also included minor incidents, like being under the influence of alcohol 
in public, and the participation in illegal demonstrations63. It is estimated that at least one 
million were innocently registered64. The court considered the storage of fingerprints, cell-
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prints and DNA-profiles of people who had been suspected but not sentenced, such as in this 
case, not to be based on a reasonable balancing between the competing public and private 
interests. Furthermore, the Court stated that it was especially worried about the risk of 
stigmatization of people in the complainants‟ situation; that is people who were not sentenced 
and who have a right to be considered innocent were to be treated the same way as people 
who have committed a felony65. 
One of the central points of this judgment is how the ECtHR addressed the nature of this 
retention: “In this respect, the Court is struck by the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the 
power of retention in England and Wales. The material may be retained irrespective of the 
nature or gravity of the offence with which the individual was originally suspected or of the 
age of the suspected offender”66 . The Government argument in this case was that the 
retaining of private information would not have any appreciable effect on the individuals 
because the information would only be used later if it could link the citizen to a criminal 
offence. The ECtHR addressed this with the following words: “The Court is unable to accept 
this argument and reiterates that the mere retention and storing of personal data by public 
authorities, however obtained, are to be regarded as having direct impact on the private-life 
interest of an individual concerned, irrespective of whether subsequent use is made of the 
data.”67 
The ECtHR arguments on this case reflect the principle of the „presumption of innocence‟; 
those not charged or convicted with a crime and thus innocent, should not have their DNA, 
fingerprints or other profiles kept by the police68. Those who advocates against the directive 
argue that this principle should also apply for the data retention directive, and they advocate 
that the argumentation of the court could be used analogically; communication data of 
innocent people which reveal contact networks and movement patterns should not be kept by 
the government. Those who argue in favour of the directive point that the court‟s reasoning in 
this specific case must be taken in consideration as a whole. DNA was not retained generally 
for the population, but innocent and acquitted people had their DNA retained the same way as 
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DNA from convicts, something that would lead to stigmatization of people in the 
complainants‟ situation, who were not sentenced and who have a right to be considered 
innocent. The reasoning here is that because the directive makes sure that the information of 
every citizen is retained, everybody gets the same treatment, hence there is no 
discrimination69. Furthermore in S and Marper v the United Kingdom, the complainants had 
limited possibilities to have data removed. If we compare this to the data retention directive, 
data is kept by the public communication provider „just‟ for a period between six months and 
two years from the date of the communication in question70. 
However, the case of S and Marper v the United Kingdom shows that the ECHR clearly have 
on a principal level condemned the blanket retention of personal information of innocent or 
acquitted individuals, without other purposes than for use in future criminal cases. 
3.43 Broader factors determining proportionality 
There are also other factors that can be taken in regard when considering if the directive is a 
proportionate measure. These factors are not strictly juridical factors, but represent 
nevertheless important arguments in when considering the overall proportionality of the mass 
retention of communication data. Evasion of the directive is easy, and the possibilities for 
evasion might have negative consequences on the fight against crime. The directive will have 
economic impacts, and cost the society and communication service providers money. The 
intention with the directive is good; the government wants to be ahead of the criminals and 
tries to prevent offences from being committed. Databases which cover the entire populations‟ 
network, contacts and movement patterns are created in case this information should be 
valuable for investigating future offences71. It is in other words a form of pre-emptive 
evidence handing. This can however also lead to an undermining of rule of law and what we 
consider liberal democratic values and the concept of the mass retention of communication 
data is in conflict with the presumption of innocence72. To answer the question if the directive 
constitutes is disproportionate it will be necessary to have a look on what broader 
consequences the mass retention of communication data might have on society as a whole.  
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One argument that points in the direction that the directive is disproportionate is the argument 
that evasion of it is relatively simple. Detection difficulties can be multiplied by using a 
public internet terminal, the use of more sophisticated anonymised web browsing systems, 
and the use of foreign-based information society service providers73. One example of how 
easy a terrorist suspect can avoid to getting caught by the mechanisms imposed by the data 
retention directive is Zacarias Moussaoui, who was charged as a conspirator in the September 
11 attacks. The FBI only discovered that Moussaoui had utilized three Hotmail accounts 
through his written court pleadings74. If the directive had been into force at the time and in the 
relevant area where he operated, it would therefore not make any difference for the prevention 
of terrorism.   
3.432 Effect on investigations 
An analysis of the German Federal Crime Agency (BKA) statistics, published by the German 
privacy rights group AK Vorrat, suggests the loss of data retention will make little practical 
difference to police75, and it is stated in the report that because of easy evasion, blanket data 
retention can actually have a negative effect on the investigation of criminal acts76. In order to 
avoid the recording of sensitive personal information under a blanket data retention scheme, 
people who of some reason wants to avoid the attention from the authorities will increasingly 
resort to Internet cafés, wireless Internet access points, anonymisation services, public 
telephones, unregistered mobile telephone cards, non-electronic communications channels 
and such like77. This avoidance behaviour can not only render retained data meaningless but 
even frustrate targeted investigation techniques (e.g. wiretaps) that would possibly have been 
of use to law enforcement in the absence of data retention78. Because of this 
counterproductive effect, the usefulness of retained communications data in some 
investigation procedures does not imply that data retention makes the prosecution of serious 
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crime more effective overall. There might be reasons blanket data retention can actually be 
detrimental to the investigation of serious crime, facilitating some investigations, but 
frustrating others79. 
3.433 Leaks 
The directive constitutes a faith in the authorities' ability to secure this type of information 
which in many cases will be very sensitive80. Stored information is never 100% safe, and there 
are many examples of information getting lost. One of the first political crises that Gordon 
Brown had to face as prime minister was when private information of 25 million British 
citizens was lost (almost half of the British population!). Information such as bank numbers, 
social security information was lost in the mail in November 200781. In 2008 a person within 
the British ministry of defence lost a laptop that contained personal information of 900 000 
people82. According to a research made by the privacy group „big brother watch‟ data has 
been lost by or stolen from UK local councils more than 1,000 times since 200883. 
Importantly, Computer systems will always be at risk of break-ins or leaks.  Just one example 
of this happened in 2011 when Sony lost private information of 77 million PlayStation users, 
possible including card details84. Another potential risk is the risk of disloyal system servants. 
One example of this is the American soldier Bradley Manning who downloaded large 
amounts of information from American intelligence, and gave it to the website wikileaks85. 
Even though many would argue that Manning represents the more heroic examples of 
„disloyal servants‟, one could imagine situations where we have a „Manning‟ with another 
political and personal agenda86. 
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One factor determining if the data retention directive is proportionate is the economic impact 
of the directive. If more money are invested in data retention this means that less will be 
available for other initiatives because of the finite number of resources available for 
competing activities87, since there is an infinite number of risks and only a limit of resources 
to spend on counter terrorism, priority should be given to those which provide the highest 
expected benefit at a low cost88.   
The direct costs of the directive includes the cost of storage and support infrastructures, 
system technology for the processing and storage of data, changes in design systems, more 
powerful and sophisticated platforms, security of archived data, costs for searching and 
retrieving archived data (making data available for law enforcement authorities) and human 
resources to handle that data89. The indirect consequences of the implementation of the 
directive is factors such as its impact on economic growth and competitiveness, impacts on 
the potential for innovation and technological development and its resulting increases or 
decreases in consumer prices90.   
A study carried out before the transposition of the Directive estimated the cost of setting up a 
system for retaining data for an internet service provider serving half a million customers to 
be around €375 240 in the first year and €9 870 in operational costs per month thereafter, and 
the costs of setting up a data retrieval system to be €131 190, with operational costs of €28 
960 per month91. The home office calculates in the impact assessment for the proposed 
changes to the UK implementation of the directive that the total economic costs over 10 years 
starting from 2011/12 are estimated to be £1.8 billion. The additional costs to the private 
sector relate to the investment in capabilities required by Communication service Providers to 
implement suitable systems to capture, retain and transmit data are estimated at £859m over 
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ten years92. The home office also calculates in the impact assessment with benefits, 
calculating the benefits of the implementation of the directive in a 10 year period to be 
expected benefits from addressing the decline in the proportion of communications data 
available to the police and others are estimated to be £5.0 – £6.2 billion.  
The assessment takes into account an analysis of criminal behaviours by the Serious and 
Organized Crime Agency and an analysis of the future communications. The largest 
categories of benefits are direct financial benefits arising mainly from preventing revenue loss 
through tax fraud and facilitating the seizure of criminal assets93. However, the different 
estimates provided by governments and service providers have caused uncertainty as to which 
cost are truly reflective of the financial impact of this measure. Criminals are rational agents 
who will adapt their behavior after what government measures are taken to fight crime94, and 
hence an analysis of what economic benefits crime fighting measure like the data retention 
directive would lead to would therefore be difficult to predict. Furthermore the governments 
cost analysis on the direct costs of the directive has been significantly lower than those 
provided by the telecommunication and electronic communications industry95. The LSE 
suggests that the real cost may be closer to £12 billion96. 
Furthermore, Additional costs will be the indirect economic costs. The directives will lead to 
an inconsistency in the marked because the contracting states can choose, or choose not to 
compensate the service providers. This can have to a negative impact of competition between 
communication service providers in Europe.  More expensive communication-services may 
furthermore lead customers to use international webmail services (that is non-EU providers) 
and new marked participants to take their business elsewhere. In conclusion; the economic 
disadvantages of the data retention directive therefore outweigh the economic advantages97. 
One thing is certain; the directive is going to be a costly affair. 
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3.435 Chilling effect 
People might change their behaviour if they know there is a possibility they are being 
watched, this is what is called the „chilling effect‟. A poll of 1,000 Germans found in 2008 
that indiscriminate blanket communication data retention is acting as a serious deterrent to the 
use of telephones, mobile phones, e-mail and the Internet98. The survey conducted by the 
research institute Forsa found that with communications data retention in place, one in two 
Germans would refrain from contacting a marriage counsellor, a psychotherapist or a drug 
abuse counsellor by telephone, mobile phone or e-mail if they needed their help. One in 
thirteen people said they had already refrained from using telephone, mobile phone or e-mail 
at least once because of data retention, which extrapolates to 6.5 million Germans in total99. 
There can be no doubt that obstructing confidential access to help facilities poses a danger to 
the physical and mental health of people in need as well as to the safety of the people around 
them100. 
If an entire population knows that there is a possibility they might be snooped on, and that 
information stored about them might get out of hand, this will possibly change society as a 
whole, and lead to a „chilling effect „of the entire society. Knowing that we might be watched, 
would we start to behave differently101? How many might think twice about participating in 
political markings if they know that this can trigger interests from the American embassy102? 
How many will refrain from participating in public debates because they do not find it is 
worth the burden it might cause? In what way will this influence the exchange of views which 
is the backbone of democracy?103 The fear of knowing that information about you might get 
out of hand, or that you are being watched will lead the population to restrain themselves, and 
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it will have a „chilling effect‟ on the people‟s will to participate in public life and hence 
democracy104.  
3.5 Summary and Concluding remarks. 
The data retention directive, Directive 2006/24/EC is an interference of privacy after ECHR 
Art.8 and will therefore have to be justified with the requirements of the second paragraph of 
the same article. The directive is a question of proportionality, and the ECtHR judgment of S 
and Marper v the United Kingdom shows that the blanket mass retention of ordinary citizens‟ 
personal information independently of any concrete investigation will have big problems by 
passing the ECtHR normal requirements what is considered proportionate105.  Other factors 
that indicates that the directive is disproportionate is because evasion is relatively simple by 
using for example a public internet terminal, the use of more sophisticated anonynmized web 
browsing systems, and the use of foreign-based information society service providers106. 
Furthermore, it is questionable how much the mass retention of communication data really 
matters for police investigations, and it might even have a negative effect on it. This because 
criminals are rational agents whose behaviour is best understood as an optimal response to 
incentives set by the government through expenditures on law enforcement107. The costs are 
also high, and it is difficult to tell how much the directive really costs, and even harder to say 
how much economic benefits it leads to.  All these factors point in the direction that the nature 
of blanket mass retention of communication data itself represents a disproportioned measure, 
and this point in the direction that is not „necessary in democratic society‟ as required by 
Art.8. The blanket mass retention of communication data might have many different 
consequences; but the disturbing effect it can have on society as a whole leads to the 
conclusion that while it is doubtful that data retention directive is „necessary in a democratic 
society‟ it can rather lead to harmful effects on democracy itself. 
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Chapter 4: United Kingdoms‟ implementation of the Directive. 
In the United Kingdom the data retention directive, 2006/24/EC is implemented through the 
Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009/857.These regulations relate to internet 
access, internet e-mail and internet telephony as well as mobile and fixed line telephony108. 
They revoke and supersede the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2007 (SI/2199) 
which transposed the parts of Directive 2006/24 /EC relating to mobile and fixed 
telephony109.A standard period of 12 months applies across the board meaning that internet 
communications data will have to be retained by notified public communication providers110. 
Part 11 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ACTCA) already provided a 
legal basis for the retention of communications data in the UK for certain purposes. These 
regulations made the retention of communications data mandatory rather than voluntarily for 
the service providers111. 
4.1 The margin of appreciation. 
A factor in determining if the measures imposed by the data retention directive are 
proportionate is the national implementation of the directive where the states are given a 
certain competency and a margin of appreciation. The contracting state has the competency to 
decide what grounds stipulates the access to data, which authorities are allowed to access the 
information, and how the authorization to retained data is given112. In the United Kingdom 
this is regulated through the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000 (RIPA).The 
Human Rights act of 1998 Art.2 determines that a court or a tribunal must take in to account 
any judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human 
Rights113, and Art 3 of the same act requires the court to interpret the primary legislation and 
subordinate legislation in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights114. Therefore 
when considering the proportionality of the data retention directive as a whole, it is important 
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to see if the UK legislation is within the boundaries of the margin of appreciation that the 
ECtHR have traditionally granted the contracting states. 
The ECtHR affords to the State a margin of appreciation when deciding whether an 
interference with an Article 8 right is justified under paragraph 2 of that provision. The 
margin of appreciation afforded to competent national authorities will vary according to the 
circumstances, the subject matter and its background115. Factors in determining if the measure 
is necessary in a democratic society will include the scope of the margin of appreciation 
traditionally given to the contracting states in regard to judgment by the ECtHR concerning 
access and use of data obtained from individuals by surveillance measures by the authorities. 
In the judgment of Klass and Others v Germany116, which concerned phone-tapping,  The 
ECtHR agreed for the first time that the development within espionage and terrorism could 
legitimate that the states could use intrusive means such as secret surveillance of 
communication117.In regard to the margin of appreciation of the state, the Court stated that: 
“As concerns the fixing of the conditions under which the system of surveillance is to be 
operated, the Court points out that the domestic legislature enjoys certain discretion. It is 
certainly not for the Court to substitute for the assessment of the national authorities any 
other assessment of what might be the best policy in this field (…) Nevertheless, the Court 
stresses that this does not mean that the Contracting States enjoy an unlimited discretion to 
subject persons within their jurisdiction to secret surveillance. The Court, being aware of the 
danger such a law poses of undermining or even destroying democracy on the ground of 
defending it, affirms that the Contracting States may not, in the name of the struggle against 
espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever measure they deem appropriate118”.  
Klass and Others v Germany implies that the states do have a certain margin of appreciation 
when it comes to what privacy infringing measures the government may use to pursue its 
national interests, but this margin of appreciation is not unlimited, there has to be a balance 
between the democratic values and core Human Rights principles. In the following, these 
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principles will be assessed an further clarified using cases that have come up in the ECtHR. 
The case of Liberty and Others v the United Kingdom119 emphasizes that the grounds for 
conducts have to be very precise and clear and that it does not give government officials a 
total discretion120. The judgment in Weber and Saravia v Germany121 and the judgment of 
Leander v Sweden122 shows there have to be proper safeguards in place; judicial control with 
the measure, monitoring measures, oversight and supervision as well as the destruction of data 
when it is not needed anymore123. 
4.2 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000 (RIPA) 
The access and use of retained communication data is in the UK regulated by the Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000 or RIPA. RIPA regulates five different types of 
surveillance: (i) interception of communications: telephone calls or contents of emails, (ii) 
intrusive surveillance: covert surveillance in residential premises or private vehicles, (iii) 
directed surveillance: covert surveillance in public place (iv) Covert Human Intelligent 
sources: informants and undercover agents and (v) communications data: any record of the 
communication but not the actual content of the communication124.   The last mentioned is 
what this chapter will concentrate on. Communication is dealt with in Part (i) chapter 2 of 
RIPA. Section 22 set out the conducts for accessing the record of telephone calls and 
electronic communications. Section 25 lists which authorities that can access these records. In 
addition, part IV of the act lists the „independent oversight‟, the control mechanisms; which is 
the „communication commissioner‟, and the „Investigatory Powers Tribunal‟. 
4.21 Grounds for granting access to communication data. 
Section 22(2) of the RIPA act stipulates under which grounds the access to communication 
data might be given. The grounds for accessing retained communication data goes over a wide 
span from „interests of national security‟, to the „purpose of protecting public health‟. The 
provision does not give any further elaborations about the content of the terms, but provides 
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that obtaining communications data may be necessary for the purpose of preventing disorder, 
protecting public health, assessing or collecting tax or other charges payable to the 
government, or for the purpose of preventing, or mitigating (where applicable) death, injury 
or damage to a person's physical or mental health in an emergency; in the interests of public 
safety; or for any purpose which the Secretary of State specifies by order125.  
The terms used in RIPA is very broad and gives a big scope of discretion. The question is 
therefore if this can be said to be in „accordance with the law‟ as required by ECHR art.8.  
In the case of Liberty and Others v The United Kingdom126 the ECtHR made it clear it was not 
prepared to accept terms such as „State security‟ as a legal basis for the monitoring of large 
amount of communication traffic127. 
The background of the case was the „troubles‟ in Northern Ireland, and British anti-terror 
measures which involved what the court described as „generalized strategic monitoring or 
blanket monitoring of communications traffic, as opposed to the targeting of specific 
individuals128‟ .The United Kingdom had systems in place such as „catch words‟ which would 
trigger the surveillance. Between 1990 and 1997 it was alleged that British authorities 
intercepted all telephone, facsimile and e-mail communications carried on microwave radio 
between two British Telecom radio stations in Wales and Cheshire. These links carried much 
of Ireland‟s telecommunications traffic. The court in its judgment found that this blanket 
monitoring granted to the executive „unfettered discretion‟ as in theory everybody who 
received or sent communications within this time could have had their communications 
intercepted129; “In their observations to the Court, the Government accepted that, in 
principle, any person who sent or received any form of telecommunication outside 
the British Islands during the period in question could have had such a communication 
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intercepted (…)The legal discretion granted to the executive for the physical capture of 
external communications was, therefore, virtually unfettered130”. 
The court found that the British interception of communication act of 1985 was not specific as 
to what captured material was listened to or read, terms such as „national security‟ and 
„preventing and detecting serious crime‟ were too general131 : “In conclusion, the Court does 
not consider that the domestic law at the relevant time indicated with sufficient clarity, so as 
to provide adequate protection against abuse of power, the scope or manner of exercise of the 
very wide discretion conferred on the State to intercept and examine external 
communications. In particular, it did not, as required by the Court’s case-law, set out in a 
form accessible to the public any indication of the procedure to be followed for selecting for 
examination, sharing, storing and destroying intercepted material. The interference with the 
applicants’ rights under Article 8 was not, therefore, “in accordance with the law”132. 
 In conclusion the Court found that the relevant British laws were a breach of ECHR Art 8(1). 
The measure was not „in accordance with the law‟. This shows that the laws have to be 
precise enough, to give conduct to examine communications.   
Liberty and others v the United Kingdom represented a blanket approach on surveillance, 
where telecommunications; communication data, was „trawled‟ and surveillance of the 
content of these communications was triggered if certain words where used in the 
correspondence.  The retention of communication data may work in a similar fashion. The 
directive imposes the entire populations‟ network, contacts and movement to be retained in 
databases, but rather than trigger words, the communication data itself may be the trigger 
mechanism. Communication data provides a detailed picture of the telecommunications, 
social environment, and movements of individuals133. The information value of traffic data 
can be, depending on the circumstances, equal to or exceed that of communication contents134, 
in fact, because section 17 of RIPA makes evidence derived by „communication content‟ 
inadmissible in court, communication data is mainly what law enforcement are interested in. 
It can therefore not be said that traffic data is typically less sensitive than content data, and it 
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is not justified to apply a lower level of legal protection to traffic data than to content data135.  
The definitions set out in RIPA of what is necessary grounds of accessing and using retained 
communication data is very similar to the terms that the ECtHR in liberty found too broad and 
vague to be „in accordance with the law136‟. Hence, there is reason to believe that the grounds 
for accessing traffic data in RIPA 22(2) are not in accordance with the law either. The 
directive combined with the broad terms in RIPA with the tool for accessing and using this 
data give the authorities a wide discretion to examine all forms for electronic communication. 
4.22 Accessing communication data. 
When an access to communication data is requested; an applicant in the public authority sets 
out an application for the requirement for communication data with an assessment of why the 
request is necessary and proportionate137. RIPA section 22(3) sets out that a „designated 
person might grant authorization to grant access to retained communication data. The 
designated person is the senior officer in the public authority, which has the responsibility to 
assess the necessity and proportionality evaluation of the application, and authorize or refuse 
to authorize the acquisition of communication data138. The whole process is overseen by a 
senior responsible officer who is held accountable for the integrity of the process139. Once 
approved, the application goes to the technicians called „the single point of contact‟ which 
acquires the data and passes it to the applicant140.  
This means that access to communication data is not given by a judicial authorization, but on 
basis of the discretion of the senior officer of the „relevant authority‟. In Klass it is implied 
that a judicial authorization is desirable, and “The rule of law implies, inter alia, that an 
interference by the executive authorities with an individual’s rights should be subject to an 
effective control which should normally be assured by the judiciary, at least in the last resort, 
judicial control offering the best guarantees of independence, impartiality and a proper 
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procedure”141. The current legislation in RIPA breaks with this principle, and hence it lacks 
guarantees to secure an independent, impartially and a proper procedure.  
Anecdotal experience from criminal practitioners is that it is unusual to find cases where 
RIPA authorization is refused; prosecutions by benefits agencies and local authorities 
regularly make use of covert surveillance in routine cases142. Access to communication data is 
often requested. If we included the investigation of crimes, 500,000 official requests to access 
phone and email records were made in 2008 – the equivalent of one in 78 adults coming under 
some form of surveillance by the authorities in the United Kingdom143. No judicial control to 
access communication data will lower the threshold for people working in public authorities 
to requests access. This can lead to arbitrariness which not can be in „accordance with the 
law‟ because it is not accessible or foreseeable what individuals working within authorities 
may put in the concept of proportionality. No judicial authorization, combined with the broad 
terms in section 22(2) that are the grounds for accessing communication data, give the people 
within the authorities an „unfettered discretion‟ which can not be lawful in regard to ECHR 
art.8.  
4.23 Delegated legislation. 
The relevant public authorities that can access retained communications data is set out section 
25(1) of the RIPA act. This includes the police and secret services, but also „other relevant 
authorities‟ may also acquire access144. RIPA contains controversial provisions enabling 
delegated legislation145 and paragraph (g) of the definition of „relevant public authority‟ in 
section 25(1) permits the Secretary of State to add further public authorities to this list146. The 
list147 that contains additional „relevant authorities‟ which is granted access to communication 
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data is long and organizations that use RIPA for access to communication data is long; the 
count in July 2008 was 792 organizations, including 474 councils148.  
Organizations as diverse as the Royal Pharmaceutical Society and the Milk Marketing Board 
have been given powers to conduct covert surveillance149. This suggests that the development 
of RIPA has turned into a „mission creep‟ where data is being used for other purposes than 
those for which they were originally collected, which is as a measure to fight serious crime 
and terrorism150. Complaints from the subjects of covert surveillance have included a nursery 
suspected of selling pot plants unlawfully, a family suspected of lying in a school 
application151 and paperboys suspected of wrong paperwork152.  
4.24 Oversight & supervision. 
In the case of Weber and Savaria v Germany, the ECtHR has accepted a far-reaching strategic 
surveillance of communication as long as the systems are subject to sufficient control153. 
Independent supervision empowered with substantial power has to be established in relation 
to all stages of interception and the establishment of reporting duties154. In Leander v. Sweden 
the safeguards contained in the Swedish personnel control system were found to be sufficient 
to fulfill the requirements Article 8, Para. 2. The Court attached much importance to the fact 
that the supervision of the proper implementation of the system was entrusted both to 
Parliament and independent institutions155. 
In RIPA, There are two bodies of „independent oversight‟ that controls the process of 
requesting, authorizing and obtaining access to communication data.  These are the 
Communications Commissioner156 who oversees the interception of communication and 
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produces a detailed report157, which is presented to the House of Commons annually. Also, the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) was set up by RIPA to provide for review by a judicial 
body of public authorities under RIPA. This tribunal has the power to investigate complaints 
and if they are upheld, it can quash authorizations, order the destruction of records and award 
financial compensation and do therefore have some substantial power158. The Communication 
commissioners do give some oversight entrusted to the parliament. However, According to 
the commissioners‟ report 494,078requests for communication data were made in 2010 and 
only noted 895 errors during the reporting year159. The Investigatory Powers Tribunal received 
the same year 164 complaints160. The massive number of requests for communication data and 
the small number of complaints and errors indicates either that system and legislation that 
gives access and disclosure to communication data works smoothly, and that the access and 
disclosure of communication data is very seldom being abused. It might on the other hand 
indicate a system, where the nature of this systematic mass retention of data makes the 
oversight and supervision mechanism of the system insufficient considering the enormous 
amount of requests for traffic data where hundred thousands of requests are made annually. 
Meaningful supervision and compliance is difficult to achieve when more resources are put 
into monitoring of data than its regulation. Unless it is fully resourced, any regulator cannot 
do more than scratch the surface to ensure compliance with the rules161.  
4.3 New legislation 
The UK government are now to introduce new laws in this field. The Queen's speech on the 
9th of May 2012 included the following: „My government intends to bring forward measures 
to maintain the ability of the law enforcement and intelligence agencies to access vital 
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communications data under strict safeguards to protect the public, subject to scrutiny of draft 
clauses162‟  
A draft bill was published on Thursday, 14th June163 and a joint committee will report on the 
bill by the end of November 2012. It will also be looked at by two other committees. The bill 
is expected to be ready after 7th Jan 2013. It is expected to be announced in the Queen's 
Speech in May 2013 and debated in the 2013-14 parliamentary session164. As stated in Under 
Part 1 of the Bill, individual Communication Service providers‟ may be given a notice by the 
Secretary of State to obtain, process and retain communications data they would not 
ordinarily hold for their own business purposes e.g. data relating to new or innovative 
communications services165. In practice the new law will be allowing police and security 
services to extend their monitoring of the public's email and social media communications, 
the Home Office has confirmed166. Examples of information that the UK government now 
wants the communication service providers to store for a period of 12 months in addition to 
what is already retained is:  who communicates with each other on social mediums like 
Facebook and Twitter, who you have contact with on online games, and which websites you 
visit167. 
The purpose of this is to make it more difficult for people to evade the directive, and to close 
the gaps between uptake in the use of new communication services like webmail, social 
networking and gaming services, which are almost entirely provided by companies located 
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overseas168. Whether this will help fighting crime and making the society safer is yet to be 
seen, but it will impose further infringement of individuals‟ privacy.  
4.4 Summary and Concluding remarks. 
The European Court of Human Rights have traditionally given the States a broad margin of 
appreciation when it comes to the national discretion of implementation of measures to 
protect the national security and defend criminality; however this limit is not unlimited and 
have to be balanced with democratic values and human right principles. The terms set out in 
RIPA are incompatible with these values and principles. The reasons authorities might access 
communications data retained from communication service providers is vague and general, 
and this gives the relevant authority an unfettered discretion to decide when to request access 
for communication data; the case of Liberty and others v the United Kingdom shows that the 
ECtHR demands precise and clear legislation.  
There is no juridical control on accessing traffic data; the authorization to access retained 
communication data is given by senior officer of a relevant authority, based on this persons 
discretion of what is considered proportionate. These factors combined with the delegated 
legislation that gives hundreds of different councils and agencies access to communication 
data, and insufficient control and overview leads to a state of arbitrariness that is not „in 
accordance with the law‟ nor „necessary in a democratic society‟.   
The British laws on access and use of retained communication data are already going further 
than what the directive imposes the contracting states to do, and goes outside of the States 
margin of appreciation. However, The United Kingdom is now reconciling the legislation. 
When the existing laws in RIPA are already dubious in regard to civil liberties and privacy, 
the new proposals takes this a step further. Some time ago, Richard Thomas, the Information 
Commissioner, expressed concern that the UK was “sleep-walking into a surveillance 
society”. More recently, he said he “is worried that we are in fact sprinting towards a 
surveillance society”169. There are reasons to believe that this is in fact what is happening. The 
                                                          
168
Home Office (n 165) 5 
169
 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, „A Surveillance Society? Oral and written evidence‟. Fifth 
report of Session 2007-08,186. 




forthcoming Communication Data bill will represent the most significant piece of legislation 
of covert surveillance that the United Kingdom has ever seen170.  
The United Kingdom have been one of the states that have lobbied the hardest to get the 
European Union to adopt the directive171, and is a nation that have implemented this directive 
in a way that breaches fundamental rights and even want to take this even further, with putting 
further surveillance measures in force. It can be said that it is ironic that the United Kingdom, 
who historically have been a lantern of liberty when continental Europe have been gloomy 
and under oppressing regimes, have taken this direction, when the Constitutional Courts in 
nations who have had  historical ties to totalitarian regimes have found the directive to be 
incompatible with their respective constitutions. Maybe it is when one first has experienced to 
live in suppression that one understands the value of defending the political framework 
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Chapter 5: Norwegian implementation of the directive. 
The directive applies both to Norway and the United Kingdom. Because the directive imposes 
the same minimum requirements for the States to retain communication data, the basics 
requirements when it comes to data retention are the same in Norway as in the United 
Kingdom. However there are some differences lying in the national implementation where the 
states have discretion. The United Kingdom have mainly a different approach to Norway on 
what procedures are to (i) be followed in order for the authorities to gain access and the use of 
the retained data, and (ii) the length of time the communication service providers are 
obligated to store the data.  
5.1. Background 
After the judgment in ECJ of Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union173 when an application for annulment of the Directive was rejected on the basis that the 
Directive properly sought to limit national disparities which might either affect fundamental 
freedoms or market competition174, it was clear once and for all that the directive was relevant 
for the European Economic Community, and therefore would also apply to Norway who is 
not a member of the European Union. 
In Norway the data retention directive have created a lot of discussions, and after a period of 
heated public debate the plans to implement the data retention directive in Norwegian law was 
approved with the slightest of margins in the parliament on the 4 April 2011 with 89 votes in 
favor of the implementation of the directive and 80 against. According to plan it was to go 
into force on the 1 of April 2012, but this was postponed until the 1 of July. The directive was 
then further postponed until January 2013175 and it is still uncertain if this deadline will be 
met176. In a report made on behalf of the Norwegian Department of Communication 
(Samferdselsdepartementet) it was made clear that the government have no idea how much 
the directive is going to cost, nor how to resolve the issues on who will bear the expenditures 
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of the directive177. Many private Norwegian organizations are deeply concerned about the 
impact the directive has on privacy, and a group lead by the former director of the Norwegian 
data inspectorate have started fundraising to bring the directive to the Norwegian Supreme 
Court (Høyesterett) and if necessary all the way to the ECtHR in Strasbourg178 
5.2. Changes in Norwegian legislation. 
The implementation of the data retention directive in Norway will be done through changes in 
existing national legislation179. The major changes in Norwegian legislation to implement the 
directive will be done through the “law relating to legal procedure in criminal cases” 
(Straffeprossessloven180) and through the “law relating to electronic communications” 
(Ekomloven)181. The changed provisions in „Straffeprossessloven‟ will concern the legal 
procedures for access and use of retained data. While the obligations for the communication 
service providers to store communication data is regulated through „Ekomloven‟.  
The new legislation will require the communication service providers to retain 
communication data for a period of 6 months for: „The investigation, detection and 
prosecution of serious criminal offences‟. Those are offences that qualify for a specified 
number of years of imprisonment. Disclosure of communication data can only be given by the 




                                                          
177
 Report from committee appointed by the Norwegian Justice department, and Communication department 
‟available at: 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/SD/Vedlegg/rapporter_og_planer/2012/rapportkostnadsfordelingsutvalgetdl
d.pdf> (accessed 7/8 2012) 
178
Sverre Steen, „Motstandere av datalagringsdirektivet vil ta saken til Høyesterett og Strasbourg‟ (“Opponents 
of the Data Retention Directive will take the case to the Supreme Court and the Strasbourg”) (Nationen 02 April 
2012) available at: 
<http://www.nationen.no/2012/02/02/nyheter/datalagringsdirektivet/dld/georg_apenes/anders_brenna/7226281> 
Accessed 07/08 2012 
179
 Lov 2011-04-15 nr 11: Lov om endringer i ekomloven og straffeprosessloven mv. (gjennomføring av EUs 
datalagringsdirektiv i norsk rett) Part. I 
180
 Lov 22. mai 1981 nr. 25 om rettergangsmåten i straffesaker (Straffeprosessloven). 
181
 Lov-2003-07-04-83 Lov om elektronisk kommunikasjon (ekomloven). 
182
 Ibid (n 180) (n 181) 




5.3 Differences between UK and Norwegian approach on the directive. 
5.31. Retention time. 
The retention period is shorter in Norway than in the United Kingdom. In Norway 
communication data is retained for a period of 6 months while in the UK it is 12. The UK 
government justifies this retention period by reference to a two-week survey  undertaken on 
behalf of ACPO in 2005 which showed there had been 231 requests for data aged between six 
and twelve months, with 60 percent of the cases relating to murder or terrorism183. In Norway, 
the consideration to privacy has weighed more than the consideration to the value it has on 
investigation. A study which was included in the impact assessment to which the European 
Commission as well as the Presidency of the European Council, attached importance, 
demonstrated that overall, traffic data of up to 1 year was required by law enforcement 
agencies. Longer retention periods were found to provide little or no added value to law 
enforcement authorities184. Accordingly, any retention period greater than 1 year was 
considered disproportionate185. This means that the Norwegian retention period is more 
proportionate than that of the UK. 
5.32. Access and disclosure to data. 
As explained in chapter 4, the United Kingdom‟s implementation of the directive, needs no 
judicial authorization, and there is no specifications of the offence that grants the authorities 
access, just terms such as „national security‟. There is delegated legislation and hundreds of 
different councils that can request and access communication data. In the Norwegian 
legislation, certain specified types of criminality are listed, and they might qualify for certain 
penal consequences which might give the law enforcement authorities access to retained data 
if there is „reasonable grounds to suspect‟ (Skjellig grunn til mistake) a criminal offence. In 
this lies a probability assessment. „Reasonable grounds for suspicion‟ means that it is a higher 
probability that the suspect have committed the offence, than that he has not186. This 
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consideration of probability is done by a court which issues a warrant to the law enforcement 
authorities if it finds the requirements to be met. Hence, there is no delegated legislation for 
the Norwegian implementation of the directive, as there is Court control and access can only 
be given to the police if there is reasonable grounds for suspicion.  
5.4 Summary and Concluding remarks.  
It is clear that in the Norwegian government‟s approach when implementing the directive, 
consideration of individuals‟ privacy have weighed heavier than the principle has done in the 
United Kingdom, where the efficiency-principle weights heavier. The advantage of the 
Norwegian approach is that it protects the citizens from arbitrariness of the authorities. The 
advantage of the British approach is that easy access to the data retained will make the 
directive a more efficient tool for law enforcement than in Norway, as a court order is a 
process that takes time. In Norway there is no delegated legislation, which lowers the chances 
of a „mission creep‟ whereas in the United Kingdom we see that retained communication data 
is already being used for other purposes than solely fighting serious crime. In conclusion the 
Norwegian laws for accessing and using the retained data are compatible with the 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions. 
We have seen that the data retention directive impose problems with regard to the 
fundamental human rights which is enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights 
Article 8; the right to respect for private life. The blanket mass retention of communication 
data is an interference with the individuals‟ right to privacy and needs to be justified. 
However, this piece of work has showed that what the data retention directive imposes is a 
disproportionate measure and hence is not justified.  
The combination of the case of S and Marper v the United Kingdom and ECtHR judgments 
concerning surveillance measures shows that the directive will have big problems passing a 
proportionality assessment in the Strasbourg court. Furthermore, it is not effective because 
criminals know how to evade it and this can actually have a negative effect on police 
investigation, there is the risk of leaks of data, the directive is an expensive affair, and what it 
does is putting an entire population under suspicion which may have a negative impact on 
society and democracy as a whole. Blanket mass retention of data represents itself a 
disproportionate measure, but the United Kingdom‟s laws of accessing and using retained 
data represents a further violation of human rights. The terms used in the legislation to access 
data is too broad to be in accordance with the law, there is no juridical control and it is totally 
based on the discretion of the senior officers in the relevant authorities. Furthermore, the 
scope of the mass retention of communication makes the supervision of the system 
insufficient. The delegated legislation in the UK laws represents a further danger in the fact 
that it can lead to a „mission creep‟ where the retained data is used more and more for other 
purposes than preventing crime and terrorism. Even though the directive itself represents a 
disproportionate measure that breaches the human right of privacy, in Norway there is at least 
the juridical safeguard that a court will control and decide when access to data should be 
granted. The United Kingdom should be considering changing its legislation in the same 
direction because the way the system works today is based on arbitrariness and state officials 
have way too broad discretion to snoop on anyone. However, the major problem between the 
directive and Human Rights lies with the principle of mass retention as a whole.  
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